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Abraham and Houseman’s (1993, 1994) calls for a systematic reor-
ganization of U.S. job security policies have again drawn attention to
reduced-hours employment—financed through short-time compensa-
tion (STC)—as an alternative to layoffs.  Under STC,1 workers receive
partial unemployment insurance (UI) benefits as compensation for
reduced working hours.  While STC programs are widely used in coun-
tries such as Belgium, Canada, France, and Germany, in the United
States they have been available in only 18 states, and the usage rates
are very low (Vroman 1990, 1992).2
The literature typically assumes that workers receiving STC are
not drawn from the pool of those who would have had their hours
reduced anyway, even without an STC program.  Such reduced-hours
employment with no offsetting compensation is called short-time work
(STW).  There has been virtually no discussion of the role of STW in
evaluating STC programs in the existing literature.  This chapter ana-
lyzes the incidence of STW in the United States for 1968–1993 and the
potential implications for evaluating the impact of STC programs.
Conventional wisdom holds that STW is not widely used in the
United States.  Yet the answer depends on the measure of STW used.
In terms of incidence per worker, STW use is fairly widespread: the
STW rate ranges from about 50 to 70 percent of the layoff rate.3  How-
ever, in terms of total hours adjustment, the STW rate is dwarfed by the
layoff rate.
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The main implication for STC program evaluation is that wide-
spread expansion of STC programs is most likely to benefit workers
already on or subject to STW, not necessarily workers on or subject to
layoffs.  There is not necessarily anything wrong with this conclusion.
Just as the UI system was established to provide consumption insur-
ance to workers subject to employment shocks, STC programs could
be expanded to insure STW workers against partial employment
shocks.  However, this aspect of STC has not been a focus of previous
authors, who instead have concentrated on the spillover effects of STC
on layoffs.
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section discusses the
existing literature on STC and related evidence on employment adjust-
ment using layoffs versus hours; the following section presents the
empirical evidence that STW is already widely used in the United
States with particular attention paid to the prevalence of STW in STC
and non-STC states; and the last section concludes the chapter.
SHORT-TIME COMPENSATION AND SHORT-TIME WORK
Unemployment insurance was conceived as a program to insure
workers’ consumption against unexpected employment shocks.  It was
presumed that the beneficiaries would be people who would suffer an
unemployment spell regardless of whether there was a UI payment sys-
tem.  However, an extensive literature has highlighted an unintended
side effect of the UI system in the absence of perfect experience rating:
workers get laid off who would otherwise have remained employed
because UI payments offer an implicit subsidy to layoffs (Hamermesh
1993, pp. 307–315).  Many authors have attempted to measure the
number of “excess” layoffs created by imperfect experience rating.
Approximately 20–40 percent of temporary layoffs are in this category
(Topel 1983; Card and Levine 1994; Anderson and Meyer 1994).  This
figure is substantial and has implications for potential overuse of STC,
as discussed below.  However, the pertinent observation for this section
is that a majority of UI claimants would have been laid off even in the
absence of a UI program.  This suggests that the primary beneficiaries
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of STC programs are likely to be people who would be put on STW
even in the absence of an STC program.
There are three pools of workers from which STC-compensated
employees can be drawn.  Each group is denoted by the state in which
they would have been in the absence of an STC program: workers who
are laid off in response to a demand shock, workers whose hours are
not adjusted at all, and workers whose hours are cut back.  The preva-
lent view in the literature is that only the first and second groups of
workers are tapped for inclusion in STC programs:
[S]hort time compensation (STC) represents an alternative to lay-
offs as a way for firms to reduce labor inputs in periods of slack
demand.  Currently the standard procedure for reducing work
hours is to lay off the least senior employees.  This action concen-
trates the reduction in hours narrowly among a small number
while leaving other workers unaffected.  An alternative procedure
for reducing labor input is to retain all employees by reducing
weekly hours for a much larger fraction of the firm’s work force.
(Vroman 1990, p. 71)
Little mention is made of the existence of STW in the absence of
STC, particularly by those advocating STC programs.  One exception
is Hamermesh (1978, pp. 249–250), who noted that
While the subsidy [STC] will to some extent encourage the expan-
sion of the activity that is subsidized [STW], it will also reward
those economic agents—in this case firms and workers—that
would engage in the subsidized activity even in the absence of the
subsidy.  Because of this windfall much of the payment for short-
time work under any STC scheme cannot result in increased
employment, but is instead a transfer from those whose taxes
exceed their receipts from STC to those for whom the opposite is
true.
The vast majority of authors since Hamermesh have simply
ignored this issue.  One of the lone exceptions is Best (1981, p. 96),
who dismisses Hamermesh’s critique, stating that
[T]he incidence of such workweek reduction [STW] appears to be
low in the United States and commonly smaller than the 10 per-
cent threshold reduction of worktime required before employees
are eligible to receive benefits.
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In support of this conclusion, Best cites only one source, Henle
(1978, p. 267), who stated that “the evidence seems to indicate that the
prevalence of such work sharing arrangements is quite limited.”  This
conclusion was based on union contract data showing that about 20
percent of contracts provided for hours reductions in the face of slack
work, and that such provisions were generally not utilized.  However,
this was the full extent of statistics provided to support these conclu-
sions.4  Moreover, because unionized workers account for only a
minority of the workforce, Best’s dismissal of the importance of STW
is clearly premature without additional evidence for nonunionized
workers.
Bednarzik (1980), the only other author to analyze the incidence of
STW, tracked the aggregate STW rate for 1956–1979. However, the
only comparison made with other aspects of the labor market was the
aggregate unemployment rate.  This created the impression that STW
is relatively underutilized because the unemployment rate is many
times larger than the STW rate.  The proper comparison for an STC
evaluation is STW versus layoffs, because both represent employer-ini-
tiated changes in hours in response to demand shocks.  Moreover, lay-
offs typically account for only about 15 percent of unemployment in
any given year (Economic Report of the President 1996).  As shown
below, the incidence of STW in fact is often comparable to the inci-
dence of layoffs.
EMPLOYMENT VERSUS HOURS ADJUSTMENT
It has long been recognized that fixed costs of hiring and firing
workers inhibit a firm from using employment adjustment as the only
way to adjust total labor input (Oi 1962).  Consequently, in the short
run firms adjust hours per worker as a substitute for adjusting the num-
ber of workers (Rosen 1968; Fair 1969; see Caballero et al. 1995 for a
recent example using data from individual manufacturing plants).
Previous research has directly compared employment and hours
adjustment for the United States versus other countries that have much
more liberal STC provisions (Abraham and Houseman 1993; Van
Audenrode 1994).  Both Abraham and Houseman and Van Audenrode
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found that the adjustment of total hours in the United States is done
more through employment than through average hours per worker.
Both studies concluded that the relative lack of a generous STC sub-
sidy plays a role in this: U.S. firms use employment adjustment rela-
tively more than hours adjustment presumably because the former are
more heavily subsidized.  However, Van Audenrode suggested that a
reduced reliance on layoffs would occur only if the proportionate sub-
sidy to STC exceeded that for layoffs.  Abraham and Houseman advo-
cated an expansion of STC at the same time that experience rating for
layoff UI benefits is tightened.  Thus, both studies did not presume that
simple changes to STC alone would necessarily reduce firms’ reliance
on layoffs.
These authors’ hesitance to advocate expansion of STC as the only
way to shift labor adjustment away from layoffs is well-founded. In
particular there are both institutional and mechanical differences
between labor markets across different countries.  Though STW may
be used relatively more in countries with more liberal STC, such a cor-
relation is not proof that changes in STC provisions would produce a
similar reliance on STW in the United States.  In particular, tighter
experience rating of UI alone might eliminate the excess reliance on
layoffs without the need for a generous STC subsidy.  This is precisely
the point made by Burdett and Wright (1989), who show that an STC
subsidy leads to an inefficient number of hours per worker.
The reliability of cross-country comparisons such as those above
are also limited by the nature of shocks that hit particular industries.
Aggregate net employment changes mask much larger offsetting flows
through gross job creation and destruction.  In particular, there are
large differences in job reallocation rates between countries (Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996, p. 21).  It is naive to presume that such
cross-country differences can be fully explained by parameters of UI
and STC alone.  They undoubtedly arise due to differences in a host of
factors such as country size, population and industrial concentration,
internal migration patterns, barriers to entry for new businesses, merger
and takeover rules, bankruptcy laws, union organizing laws, the demo-
graphic makeup of the labor force, societal differences in between-job
mobility, welfare system influences on work behavior, overtime pay
rules, etc.5
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Limiting the analysis to nominally comparable, narrowly defined
industries (as do Abraham and Houseman 1993) does not negate the
role of these other factors that affect the ability and preferences of indi-
vidual firms to adjust labor input.  Abraham and Houseman (1994) par-
tially address this issue by analyzing the effect of weakening
employment security laws in Germany, France, and Belgium.  They
find that such changes—which presumably decreased the costs of lay-
offs—did not measurably increase reliance on employment (over
hours) adjustment in those countries.  While informative, such evi-
dence is not proof that expanding STC coverage in the United States
would increase reliance on hours adjustment.  If anything, their results
suggest that such an expansion could easily have no measurable impact
on the use of layoffs.
Thus, there is a clear need to analyze the use of STW in the United
States as a way of predicting the impact of STC programs.  Such an
analysis is better than cross-country comparisons of employment ver-
sus hours adjustment because a vast majority of between-country dif-
ferences in other factors are held constant for a within-country
analysis.  Moreover, the data used here allow the identification of hours
reductions below usual hours worked.6  They also allow the identifica-
tion of employment adjustment through layoffs.  Both of these are
more accurate measures of the relevant margins on which firms
actively decrease labor input than measures such as the relative usage
of total hours adjustment versus total employment adjustment (which
include both increases and decreases in labor input).  In particular, the
latter measures include labor turnover that occurs through hiring and
voluntary separations, which are important components of labor adjust-
ment but are not of primary importance for predicting firms’ responses
to changes in layoff versus STW subsidies.
THE USE OF STW IN THE UNITED STATES
The data used for this study are drawn from two different sets of
Current Population Survey (CPS) data: the 1968–1993 March Annual
Demographic Files, and the 1979–1993 Outgoing Rotation Group Files
(for all 12 months in the year).  The sample was limited to wage and
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salary workers age 16 and older.  A worker is defined to be on STW if
1) the total number of hours worked during the survey week (at all
jobs) are less than 35, 2) usual hours are greater than 35, and 3) the rea-
son given for working less than 35 hours during the survey week is
slack demand, material shortage, or plant/machine repair.  Bednarzik
(1980) included only those who indicate slack work in his measure of
STW.  I include the other two because they also represent employer-
initiated hours reductions, which could be induced by demand shocks.
Regardless, these two categories consistently account for less than 10
percent of STW, so excluding them would not substantively alter any
of the conclusions.
The analysis covers data through 1993 because data for 1994 and
after are not directly comparable.  The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(1994) introduced a major redesign of and improvement to the CPS in
1994, making comparisons with earlier years problematic.  A full rec-
onciliation of the STW rates for 1993 and earlier compared with 1994
and later is beyond the scope of this study.  However, one important
difference should be noted.  During 1993, the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics administered both the old and new versions of the CPS.  This
allowed for a single year comparison of differences in the measured
levels of layoffs and STW.
People on STW are a subset of those who usually work full time
yet are part time during the survey week.  According to the new, more
accurate survey, the actual level of this larger category of “temporary”
part-time workers—of which STW is a subset—is 25 percent lower
than recorded in the old survey.  In contrast, the actual level of layoff
unemployment is 10 percent higher (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
1994).  Unfortunately, there is no way to determine definitively
whether these biases in the old measures (the ones used in the present
study) were consistent over time.  However, there is no particular rea-
son to believe they were not consistent.  Regardless, the reader should
keep in mind the biases while reviewing the empirical evidence below.
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CYCLICAL PATTERNS
Figure 1 graphs the rates of STW and layoffs for 1968–1993 using
the March data.  Throughout the chapter, the STW and layoff rates are
calculated using the same base for the labor force: all those employed
or on layoff.  People unemployed for reasons other than layoff are
excluded from the analysis.7
The incidence of STW in Figure 1 is comparable to layoffs; the
layoff rate is appreciably higher only during the 1970s and early 1980s
recession years.  Throughout the most recent recession, the STW and
layoff rates were virtually identical.  Adjusting for the biases men-
tioned above would raise the layoff rate by 10 percent and lower the
STW rate by 25 percent.  Accounting for this, the true STW rate is
approximately 50 to 70 percent of the layoff rate.  The use of STW is
concentrated in industries such as construction that heavily use layoffs,
as shown in Table 1.
While the incidence of STW is comparable to layoffs, total hours
adjustment is comparable only to short-term layoffs.  This can be seen
in Figure 2, which graphs the incidence of STW and layoffs in the top
panel (as a fraction of employment), and the percentage of total hours
Figure 1 The Incidence of Layoffs and Short-Time Work 
for Entire Labor Force
SOURCE: Calculations based on March Current Population Surveys, 1968–1993.
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Table 1 Short-Time Work Rates as a Share of Employment and of Total Hoursa (%)
Selected industries Selected occupations








Year Emp. Hrs. Emp. Hrs. Emp. Hrs. Emp. Hrs. Emp. Hrs. Emp. Hrs.
1979 0.96 0.33 2.65 1.08 0.84 0.31 0.15 0.05 0.38 0.12 1.78 0.64
1980 1.29 0.43 3.37 1.43 1.53 0.47 0.28 0.09 0.45 0.13 2.50 0.86
1981 1.27 0.41 3.48 1.50 1.35 0.46 0.15 0.07 0.39 0.13 2.44 0.81
1982 1.69 0.52 4.37 1.68 2.58 0.73 0.16 0.06 0.74 0.21 3.52 1.15
1983 1.30 0.40 3.37 1.27 1.50 0.42 0.11 0.04 0.52 0.15 2.71 0.88
1984 1.10 0.38 2.84 1.18 1.01 0.32 0.15 0.07 0.42 0.15 2.11 0.76
1985 1.12 0.35 2.69 1.09 1.21 0.36 0.13 0.03 0.42 0.12 2.28 0.75
1986 1.07 0.33 2.75 1.11 0.94 0.29 0.16 0.05 0.44 0.12 1.96 0.69
1987 1.01 0.33 3.17 1.25 0.79 0.25 0.15 0.05 0.41 0.11 1.79 0.66
1988 1.02 0.32 2.94 1.03 0.91 0.29 0.19 0.05 0.40 0.11 1.93 0.67
1989 1.05 0.33 3.21 1.09 0.92 0.32 0.22 0.08 0.54 0.14 1.87 0.66
1990 1.13 0.35 3.47 1.33 0.95 0.31 0.15 0.05 0.46 0.14 2.02 0.68
1991 1.38 0.43 4.81 1.86 1.48 0.43 0.12 0.06 0.65 0.19 2.61 0.91
1992 1.25 0.38 4.24 1.63 1.05 0.32 0.21 0.07 0.51 0.15 2.29 0.77
1993 1.21 0.36 3.56 1.26 0.83 0.28 0.14 0.06 0.53 0.16 1.97 0.68
a The STW rates were calculated over all workers plus unemployed in each category using CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data for all
months in the year.
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Figure 2 Layoffs and Short-Time Work: Incidence versus Hours
SOURCE: Calculations based on Current Population Surveys, Outgoing Rotation
Groups (all months), 1979–1993.
Incidence
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adjusted through both channels in the bottom panel.  For the bottom
panel, usual hours for persons on layoff had to be imputed because the
CPS does not record that measure for people not with a job.8  In both
panels, total layoffs are broken down into two separate groups: those of
duration less than 30 days and those of greater duration.  Note that this
refers to ongoing duration as of the survey date, so a significant portion
of the short-term layoffs ex post will be longer than 30 days.  But such
a division is useful because the short-duration category undoubtedly
includes a disproportionate number of layoffs that ex post will be less
than 30 days.
The data in Figure 2 and throughout the rest of the chapter, use the
Outgoing Rotation Group files so that the numbers are indicative of
employment behavior for the entire year, not just March.  This limits
the time series to 1979–1993.  However, Figure 1 shows that the degree
of cyclical correlation between STW and layoffs barely differs for
1968–1978 versus 1979–1993.  So the analysis for the most recent
years should provide results comparable to the earlier period.  More-
over, the overall pattern in the incidence of STW and layoffs in Figure
1 and the top panel of Figure 2 are virtually identical, showing that the
year-to-year movements in the two rates in Figure 1 are not contami-
nated by cyclical factors that are unique to March.
The graphs in Figure 2 show that 1) the incidence of STW is com-
parable to all layoffs, particularly since 1987, yet 2) total hours adjust-
ment through STW is only a fraction of total hours adjustment through
layoffs.  This is not surprising when one considers the likely source of
demand shocks inducing the different types of adjustment.  Firms that
put workers on STW or on layoff for a short period of time probably
have been hit by what are perceived to be temporary demand shocks.
In contrast, firms with workers who have been on layoff for more than
a month probably have been hit by what are perceived to be more per-
manent demand shocks.
This suggests that STW is more likely a substitute for short-dura-
tion layoffs than for long-duration layoffs.  If a firm needs to downsize
permanently, providing a short-term subsidy to STW through STC
should not induce the firm to retain more workers in the long run.  An
STC subsidy might temporarily postpone such layoffs, if at all, but Fig-
ure 2 suggests that such a postponement may be quite short.
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STW BY INDUSTRY AND BY OCCUPATION
Tables 1–3 report the pattern of STW usage by industry and by
occupation.  Tables 1 and 2 report incidence and hours measures for
select industries and occupations by year and by month, respectively.
Regardless of which measure is used, the more highly cyclical indus-
tries, such as construction and manufacturing, and the more highly
cyclical occupations, such as skilled laborers, have the highest rates of
STW.  However, as seen in Table 2, there is a distinct seasonal pattern
in STW for construction, with the highest rates in the winter and early
spring.9  The seasonal pattern for durable manufacturing is much less
pronounced.  This provides further evidence that usage of STW mirrors
that of layoffs.
Consolidating all the data for 1979–1993, Table 3 examines which
industries and occupations use STW the most.  As foreshadowed by the
patterns in Tables 1 and 2, the highest rates are for those that are the
most cyclical and/or seasonal: the manufacturing, construction, mining
and agriculture industries, and the skilled laborer, semiskilled laborer,
and farming occupations.
Best’s comment about the rate of reduction of hours under STC
(“. . . such workweek reduction appears to be . . . commonly smaller
than the 10 percent threshold reduction of worktime required before
employees are eligible to receive benefits”) can be assessed by ana-
lyzing the STW incidence versus hours rates in Table 3.  An estimate
of the average hours reduction under STW is available by taking the
ratio of the hours adjustment figure in column 5 over the employ-
ment adjustment figure in column 2.10  Doing so yields an average
reduction in hours of about 30 percent for each industry and occupa-
tion.  As shown in Table 4, this figure falls well within the range nec-
essary to trigger eligibility for STC for all states with such a pro-
gram.11  So Best’s statement appears to be inaccurate by this mea-
sure, at least for current STC programs.
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Table 2 Short-Time Work Rates as a Percentage of Employment and as a Percentage of Total Hours, Disaggregated 
by Montha
Selected Industries Selected Occupations








Month Emp. Hrs. Emp. Hrs. Emp. Hrs. Emp Hrs. Emp Hrs. Emp Hrs
Jan 1.39 0.46 3.74 1.60 1.29 0.42 0.12 0.05 0.53 0.17 2.51 0.90
Feb 1.32 0.42 3.62 1.56 1.42 0.43 0.17 0.05 0.50 0.14 2.53 0.89
Mar 1.22 0.39 3.52 1.46 1.37 0.42 0.12 0.08 0.51 0.14 2.51 0.85
Apr 1.13 0.37 3.74 1.44 1.20 0.42 0.20 0.06 0.47 0.16 2.28 0.80
May 1.16 0.37 3.26 1.31 1.36 0.41 0.11 0.05 0.46 0.14 2.31 0.79
June 1.18 0.36 3.24 1.22 1.11 0.31 0.26 0.07 0.53 0.15 2.24 0.73
July 1.20 0.37 3.12 1.21 1.07 0.32 0.17 0.06 0.56 0.16 2.10 0.70
Aug 1.11 0.34 2.66 1.00 1.12 0.34 0.16 0.05 0.47 0.14 2.08 0.66
Sept 1.04 0.32 2.84 1.04 0.98 0.33 0.28 0.08 0.42 0.12 1.87 0.66
Oct 1.10 0.34 3.25 1.20 1.13 0.35 0.21 0.07 0.40 0.11 2.05 0.69
Nov 1.18 0.36 3.52 1.23 1.27 0.39 0.07 0.02 0.44 0.14 2.30 0.78
Dec 1.28 0.42 3.96 1.54 1.19 0.36 0.13 0.06 0.50 0.14 2.39 0.85
a The STW rates were calculated over all workers plus unemployed in each category using CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data for 1979–
1993.
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Table 3 Short-Time Work and Layoff Rates by Industry and Occupation, 
1979–1993a










Agriculture 1.95 3.09 0.52 1.77 1.22 0.44
Mining 2.69 1.42 0.62 2.63 0.62 0.65
Construction 3.45 3.36 1.10 3.54 1.31 1.11
Durable
manufacturing 2.15 1.21 0.57 2.12 0.37 0.57
Nondurable
manufacturing 1.34 2.37 0.60 1.29 0.71 0.58
Transportation 0.80 0.88 0.22 0.80 0.36 0.22
Wholesale trade 0.72 0.74 0.18 0.68 0.26 0.16
Retail trade 0.53 1.18 0.18 0.51 0.24 0.16
Services 0.36 0.75 0.13 0.35 0.21 0.12
Public
administration 0.26 0.17 0.05 0.25 0.06 0.06
Occupation
Clerical/
administration 0.46 0.48 0.12 0.46 0.14 0.12
Skilled laborers 2.22 2.26 0.72 2.19 0.77 0.72
Educators 0.16 0.32 0.05 0.17 0.12 0.05
Farming, forestry 1.84 2.75 0.52 1.85 1.15 0.48
Medical/health 0.21 0.68 0.09 0.19 0.18 0.09
Management-
related 0.27 0.29 0.04 0.27 0.11 0.04
Semiskilled
laborer 2.53 2.65 0.76 2.66 0.89 0.79
Profess. specialty, 
not elsewhere 
classified 0.33 0.37 0.09 0.34 0.13 0.08
Personal service 0.69 1.71 0.27 0.69 0.34 0.25
Private household 
service 0.12 1.27 0.24 0.15 0.19 0.26
Protective service 0.38 0.40 0.11 0.37 0.12 0.09
Sales-related 0.43 0.89 0.14 0.43 0.19 0.12
a The STW and layoff rates were calculated over all workers plus unemployed in each
category using CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data for all months during 1979–1993.
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Table 4 Summary of Short-Term Compensation Programsa
Participating states
Duration of plan 
before new 
approval required




Arizona  1 year  26  10 to 40
Arkansas  1 year  26  10 to 40
California  6 month  b  at least 10
Connecticut  6 month  26c  20 to 40
Florida  1 year  26  10 to 40
Iowa  2 year  26  20 to 50
Kansas  1 year  26  20 to 40
Louisiana  1 year  26  20 to 40
Maryland  6 month  26  10 to 50d
Massachusetts  6 month  26  10 to 60
Minnesota  1 year  52  20 to 40
Missouri  1 year  26  20 to 40
New York  —  20  20 to 60
Oregon   1 year  26  20 to 40
Rhode Island  1 year  26  10 to 50
Texas  1 year  52  10 to 40
Vermont  6 monthe  26  20 to 50
Washington  1 yeare  26  10 to 50
SOURCE: National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers’ Com-
pennsation (1996).
a As of January 1996.
b No limit on number of weeks, but total paid can not exceed 26 × weekly benefit
amount.
c 26-week extension possible.
d 50 percent maximum may be waived by Secretary.
e Or date of plan, if earlier.
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STC VERSUS NON-STC STATES AND PARTIAL UI
Are STC programs the reason for the existence of STW in the
United States?  In order to provide a crude answer to this question,
Table 5 reports STW rates for states that have never had an STC pro-
gram (“non-STC states”) and states that have ever had an STC program
(“STC states,” including Illinois).  The answer is no, because the STW
rate has been greater for non-STC states in all years except for 1992–
1993.  It is true that many STC programs have only been introduced
recently (Table 4), so the higher rates of STW in the most recent years
for the STC states may be due to the recently adopted STC programs.12
However, Figure 3 shows that that would be a premature conclusion:
both STW and layoffs have been relatively higher in STC states in
recent years, suggesting that both are correlated with other factors,
such as different industrial compositions in the two groups of states.
So it is doubtful that usage of STC explains much of the difference in
STW between STC and non-STC states.  This is consistent with the
commonly held view that STC programs have been vastly underuti-
lized in the states that have them.
One component of the UI system in each state that may explain at
least part of the cross-state variation in STW is partial UI benefits.  Par-
tial UI benefits are available in all states when earnings fall below a
particular threshold.  However, the threshold is so low that the work-
week has to be reduced by at least 60 percent in most states.  This fact
alone indicates that the provisions for partial UI probably are not a
major factor in determining STW because the average hours reduction
is only half that needed to qualify for partial UI.  Moreover, in most
states the partial UI benefit is taxed at a 100 percent rate for any earn-
ings above a very small amount (the “disregard” amount).
Despite the fact that partial UI probably is not generous enough to
explain patterns of STW, a crude test is provided in Table 6, which
breaks the non-STC states into three groups: least generous, more gen-
erous, and most generous partial UI benefits.  States in the first group
tax partial UI benefits at a 100 percent tax rate for any earnings above
either 10 percent of wages or $40 per week.  States in the second group
also tax benefits at a 100 percent tax rate for earnings over the disre-
gard, but the disregard is higher than for the first group.  The third
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Table 5 Short-Time Work Rates as a Share of Employment for States 










1979 0.96 1.09 0.84 0.97 0.57 0.54 1.12
1980 1.29 1.48 1.13 1.34 0.73 0.86 1.24
1981 1.27 1.44 1.12 1.39 0.61 0.64 1.47
1982 1.69 1.99 1.44 1.78 0.78 0.99 1.55
1983 1.30 1.45 1.17 1.38 0.87 0.94 1.69
1984 1.10 1.27 0.96 1.03 0.67 0.70 1.16
1985 1.12 1.20 1.05 1.17 0.53 0.74 0.72
1986 1.07 1.13 1.02 1.13 0.66 1.19 1.07
1987 1.01 1.11 0.92 1.03 0.50 0.55 1.07
1988 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.21 0.55 1.10 1.58
1989 1.05 1.01 1.09 1.33 0.63 1.04 0.98
1990 1.13 1.18 1.09 1.57 0.69 0.56 1.13
1991 1.3 1.39 1.37 2.01 1.00 0.78 1.27
1992 1.25 1.10 1.36 2.17 0.96 0.45 1.52
1993 1.21 1.06 1.33 2.04 1.10 0.87 0.76
a The STW rates were calculated over all workers plus unemployed in each category
using CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data for all months in the year.
b The STC states category includes all states that have ever had an STC program, even
if the program was not in existence for one or more years during 1979–1993: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas,
Vermont, and Washington.
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Figure 3 Short-Term Work and Layoffs for STC and Non-STC States
SOURCE: Calclulations based on Current Population Surveys, Outgoing Rotation
Groups (all months) 1979–1993.
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Table 6 Short-Time Work Rates for All Non-STC States and for Non-STC States with a Partial Unemployment 
Insurance Program by Level of Benefit Generositya (%) 
As a share of employment As a share of total hours
















1979 1.09 1.18 1.09 0.85 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.30
1980 1.48 1.53 1.33 1.56 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.49
1981 1.44 1.50 1.35 1.37 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.46
1982 1.99 2.18 1.82 1.72 0.56 0.60 0.55 0.51
1983 1.45 1.54 1.37 1.31 0.43 0.46 0.41 0.45
1984 1.27 1.30 1.32 1.10 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.39
1985 1.20 1.26 1.23 0.99 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.37
1986 1.13 1.08 1.33 0.97 0.36 0.33 0.42 0.32
1987 1.11 1.10 1.11 1.15 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.36
1988 1.01 1.05 0.95 0.98 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32
1989 1.01 1.08 0.92 0.96 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.35
1990 1.18 1.28 1.05 1.11 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.29
1991 1.39 1.50 1.30 1.22 0.44 0.48 0.40 0.41
(continued)
336Table 6 (continued)
As a share of employment As a share of total hours
















1992 1.10 1.11 1.21 0.93 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.31
1993 1.06 1.15 1.00 0.89 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.27
a The STW rates were calculated over all workers plus unemployed in each category using CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data for all
months in the year.
b The “all non-STC states” category includes all states that have never had an STC program.
c The “least generous” category includes Alabama, D.C., Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia.
d The “more generous” category includes Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
e The “most generous” category includes Alaska, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, and Wisconsin.
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group taxes partial UI benefits at a rate of less than 100 percent for
earnings over the disregard amount, providing the most generous
potential benefits through partial UI.  If the partial UI programs influ-
ence the use of STW, then STW should be most prevalent among those
(non-STC) states that offer the most generous partial UI benefits.
An inspection of the numbers in Table 6 reveals that this is not the
case: the employment incidence of STW is virtually the same for non-
STC states that have the least generous partial UI programs compared
to those that have the most generous partial UI programs.  Even though
the number of workers on STW appears unaffected by partial UI bene-
fit generosity, there might still be greater hours adjustment due to
incentives provided by partial UI schemes to dramatically reduce the
length of the workweek.  Yet total hours adjustment through STW is
the same across the different levels of partial UI benefit generosity.
USING STW TO EVALUATE THE POTENTIAL 
IMPACT OF STC
The evidence presented here suggests that current patterns of STW
in the United States appear to be primarily dictated by patterns of
demand shocks and production technology, not by incentives provided
through STC or partial UI.  Thus the current patterns of STW and lay-
offs for each state should serve as a useful benchmark for researchers
who wish to gauge the relative effect of proposed expansions in STC
on STW and layoffs.  However, doing this properly requires careful
consideration of all possible factors that may affect STW, layoffs, or
both, including parameters of state STC, regular UI, and partial UI pro-
grams.  For example, it is possible that current STC programs have
marginally increased the use of STW in the states that have introduced
them.  But a complete answer to this requires a determination of
whether other incentives (and disincentives) to use UI and partial UI
changed at the same time.  Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of
this study, but should be addressed in future research.
One question that can be answered is, where should we expect to
see the highest rates of STC usage?  The limited data on STC usage
shows an uneven distribution across industries (Kerachsky et al. 1985;
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Best and Mattesich 1980).  This is not surprising given the patterns in
Table 3, which show the highest rates of STW among the most cycli-
cally and seasonally sensitive occupations.  However, there is another
potential explanation for the patterns in Table 3.  Workers in whom the
firm has invested the most training and/or who have the highest level of
skills should be less likely to be put on STW, otherwise the worker on
STW might take that as a negative signal about future employment at
the firm and decide to look for a new job.  To answer this it is necessary
to disentangle industry shocks from occupational differences in the
response to those shocks.
In order to sort out these effects, STW rates were calculated for six
major occupation groups within the seven major industries (results not
reported).  Within each industry group, the more highly skilled man-
agement and professional occupations have the lowest rates of STW,
which is consistent with firms wanting to protect investment in specific
human capital.  The clerical/administrative support occupation also has
very low rates of STW, though always higher than managers.  This
probably reflects the fact that they embody less firm-specific human
capital, yet work side-by-side with management, and so are slightly
shielded from STW because of the direct support role they play to
those workers least likely to be subject to STW.
The highest rates of STW within each industry are among the
skilled and semiskilled laborers.  The higher overall rate for laborers as
a group, relative to white-collar workers, probably reflects both differ-
ences in production technology and levels of specific human capital.  In
particular, the higher rate of STW for semiskilled laborers compared to
skilled laborers is probably due to their lower levels of skill.
STW rates tend to be comparable for the same occupation in differ-
ent industries (for example, the STW rate for managers is similar
across industries).  However, the most cyclical industries exhibit the
highest rates of STW for almost all occupations.  For example, clerical/
administrative support workers in construction have higher rates of
STW than their counterparts in services, and the same holds for each of
the other occupations within these two industries.  The same is true for
nondurable manufacturing compared to services.  However, the pattern
is less evident for durable manufacturing versus services.
These patterns suggest any expansion of existing STC programs
should produce the greatest STC incidence in cyclical industries such
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as construction and nondurable manufacturing.  Moreover, semiskilled
laborers, skilled laborers, and, to a lesser extent, sales-related occupa-
tions should also have relatively high rates of STC usage, regardless of
the industry of employment.  Obviously, analyses such as these are
only a crude first step at predicting STC take-up rates.  A definitive
answer to the effects of STC at the firm level requires firm-level data
such as that used in the Mathematica evaluations (Kerachsky et al.
1985; Needels and Nicholson 1996).  Yet STC predictions using CPS
data and techniques such as those in this study should serve as a useful
guide for researchers wishing to do more accurate analyses of the
impact of STC than have been done to date.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study has documented short-time work patterns in the United
States for 1968–1993.  Despite very low STC take-up rates, STW is a
prevalent phenomenon.  The STW rate ranges from approximately 50
to 70 percent of the layoff rate.
The primary impact of STC program expansion most likely would
be to subsidize those workers and firms that already use STW.  The
important implication of this is that vast numbers of workers could be
put on the STC roles, thereby providing “evidence” that the programs
were successful at averting layoffs, without impacting the incidence of
layoffs at all.  The key to determining the impact of STC program
expansion on layoffs is not to count the number of people on STC
alone, nor even to compare the number on STC relative to the number
on layoff. Rather, layoff and STW rates—in terms of both workers and
total hours—under STC must be compared to what they would have
been in the absence of STC.
If the subsidy to STC is relatively large, additional workers will be
put on STW relative to what would have happened otherwise, with a
less than equal decrease in adjustment through layoffs.  For example, if
STC leads to 100 “additional” hours of STW, layoffs may be reduced
by only 50 hours, with the additional 50 hours accounted for by an
overadjustment through STW.  The latter means a much greater distri-
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bution of the brunt of hours reduction across the workforce than is nec-
essary.
In an era of tight budgets and reduced social welfare spending, this
is a significant issue.  The degree of imperfect experience rating of
STC benefits is comparable to that for UI benefits.  The extensive liter-
ature on excessive use of UI due to this subsidy suggests that wide-
spread introduction and expansion of STC programs will lead to
similar overuse of STC.  Whether imperfect experience rating of both
UI and STC benefits leads to a relatively greater overuse of layoffs, of
STW, or of both is an empirical question.  However, the overall net
public subsidy to these two channels—layoffs and STW—would
ensure an excessive impact of demand shocks on the existing pool of
workers.
Unfortunately, the existing STC programs probably are too limited
in scope to satisfactorily quantify the impact of the current STC system
on employment versus hours adjustment in the United States.  How-
ever, existing patterns of STW can be used to provide baseline esti-
mates in future STC evaluations to determine that tradeoff.  Similarly,
differences in the relative subsidy to layoffs between states could be
used to analyze how imperfect experience rating affects firms’ choice
of layoffs versus short-time work.  Increased experience rating for reg-
ular unemployment insurance alone (as advocated by Hamermesh
1978, and Burdett and Wright 1989) may be sufficient to significantly
tip the scales in favor of STW over layoffs, negating one of the primary
arguments currently used by advocates for STC expansion.
Notes
I would like to thank Karen Needels for many helpful discussions, and Steve Davis,
John Haltiwanger, Susan Houseman, David Gray, and seminar participants at the
Milken Institute for helpful comments.  Gina Franco provided outstanding research
support.  Financial support from the Canadian Employment Research Forum is gra-
ciously acknowledged.  All errors are my own.
1. STC is frequently called “shared work” or “worksharing” by both researchers
(Bednarzik 1980; Meltz and Reid 1983; Vasche 1982) and state UI agencies in the
United States (National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Work-
ers’ Compensation 1996, p. 58). However, shared work is more commonly used to
refer to permanent reductions in average hours per worker (Calmfors 1985;
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Fitzroy 1981; Calmfors and Hoel 1989; Hart 1984; Riechel 1986), which is dis-
tinct from temporary reductions that are funded by partial UI benefits. The STC
name is used exclusively in this chapter because it has no alternative interpreta-
tions.
2. Illinois discontinued its program in 1988 (Vroman 1990).
3. These figures have been adjusted for the bias in the pre-1994 Current Population
Survey measures of STW and layoffs, detailed in the text.
4. In particular, no indication was given that the contracts were drawn from a repre-
sentative sample.
5. Differences in overtime pay rules and related societal conventions may be particu-
larly important unexplained factors not accounted for by Abraham and Houseman
and by Van Audenrode.  Their analyses treat increases and decreases in labor
usage symmetrically, with no metric for measuring the difference between usual
hours and actual hours worked.  Thus much of cross-country differences and sim-
ilarities that they measure may be identified by deviations above, not below, usual
hours worked.
6. See note 5.
7. Bednarzik does not include workers on layoff when calculating the STW rate.
Consequently, the rates reported here are not directly comparable to those in his
study.
8. This was done by regressing usual hours on a host of demographic variables (race,
marital status, age, education) and industry and occupation dummies separately
for men and women for each year.
9. The seasonal pattern of STW in construction underscores the concern of STC pro-
gram administrators that STC not be used to subsidize seasonal employment.
However, despite this concern it is not clear whether existing STC guidelines are
sufficient to prevent abuse by firms that experience predictable seasonal employ-
ment changes.
10. This estimate is perfectly accurate only if STW workers’ mean usual hours are the
same as non-STW workers’ mean usual hours.  This is probably a good approxi-
mation.
11. Illinois is not included in the Table 4 text because its program has been discontin-
ued. However, Illinois is included as one of the STC states in all calculations
because it did have an STC program during 1979–1993.
12. Note that the group of STC states includes observations for years in which some
of the included states did not have an STC program (such as Kansas for 1979–
1988 and Washington for 1979–1982).
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